Executive summary

This document offers DIGITALEUROPE’s contributions to the European Supervisory Authorities’ (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) public consultation on the second batch of policy mandates under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA).

This includes a response to the draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) on: content, timelines and templates on incident reporting; subcontracting of critical or important functions; threat-led penetration testing (TLPT); and on harmonisation of conditions enabling the conduct of the oversight activities.

Content, Timelines, and Templates on Incident Reporting

Proposed timelines for reporting of major incidents

Article 3:

To avoid unnecessary delays to notification, where the financial entity is unable to determine the exact moment the incident occurred, the financial entity should measure the duration from when the incident was declared by the financial entity.

Suggested amendment in Article 3(1): after the words “they shall measure the duration of the incident from” deleted the words “the earlier between”; and after the words “the moment it was” replace the words “detected and the moment when it has been recorded in network or system logs or other data sources” with the words “declared by the financial entity”.

Content of initial reports: BCP Activation may occur in later stages than the initial notifications. In PSD2 it is required in the intermediate report.

Content of intermediate reports:
- **4(c)** not always able to provide with this information according to the timelines requirements for intermediate reports, since there may be ongoing mitigation activities.
- **4 (f) and (g)** there may be under propagation by the time of intermediate report.
- **4(i)**: We suggest deletion since it implies a risk itself.
- **4(k)**: Suggest deletion.

**Content of Final Reports:**

- **5(h)**: We suggest deletion. BAU cost should not be relevant for determining the material impact and it’s related to internal organisation
- **5(f)**: We suggest to include the reclassification also in the intermediate reports

**Article 6:**

Financial entities will tremendously rely on ICT service providers to assist them in incident classification. If the time between the detection of the incident by the FE and the notification of this incident to the service provider deducted from the draft maximum 24h timeframe, the time left for the service provider to do their incident assessment, including all incidents that later turn out to be non-major, is too short. In reality, more time is needed until the impact of an incident is understood.

Regarding the timeline for submission of an initial report, we suggest the following amendment to Article 6(1)(a) of the RTS: replace the words “24 hours” with “5 days” and add the words “by the financial entity” at the end of the sentence. We consider that 5 days is a more realistic timeframe for submission of the initial report. In our experience, organizations cannot reliably determine the scope of impact of an event more quickly than that. Adding the words “by the financial entity” is requested to clarify that it is the detection of a reportable incident by the financial entity that “starts the clock” and not, for example, detection by a third party of information upon which the financial entity may relay to determine whether a major incident has occurred.

Regarding the timeline for submission of an intermediate report, we suggest the following amendment to Article 6(1)(b) of the RTS: replace the words “72 hours” with “20 days”. We consider this longer timeline more realistic and capable of being achieved.

Regarding the timeline for submission of a final report, we suggest the following amendment to Article 6(1)(c) of the RTS: replace the words “classification of the incident as major” with “date of submission of the intermediate report”. Again, we consider this longer timeframe more realistic.
Data fields proposed in the draft RTS and the Annex to the ITS for inclusion in the initial notification for major incidents under DORA

- **1.15** – We suggest: To be provided only where the third-party provider is different from the entity submitting the report or the entity affected by the major incident.
- **1.18** – Reporting currency suggested into the final report.
- **2.6** – Discovery of the incident We suggest to align it with the ECB terminology of Incident Identification / classification.
- **2.7** – Indication whether the incident originates from a third party provider or another financial entity - *What's the view for intragroup entities?*
- **2.8-2.10** – combine into one data field. FI are unable to determine the impact of incidents in other financial entities or third parties. Suggest yes, if applicable at all stages.
- **2.11** – this would be in the final report if chosen as incident cause (recurring; 3.4). Unclear why this included. Remove.
- **2.13** – Information on whether the incident relates to a previous incident. It can only be referred to previous reported major incidents. In other regulations like PSD2, this information is in later stages, please reconsider inclusion in the initial report.
- **2.15** – Business continuity plan: description - In some cases the execution of some recovery procedures or workaround may not require a formal activation of the BCP even though those procedures could be included as part of the BCPs documentation. We suggest inclusion in the Intermediate report.

Data fields proposed in the draft RTS and the Annex to the ITS for inclusion in the intermediate report for major incidents under DORA

- **3.1** – Further clarification required concerning when the incident referral code will be provided and whether the code will remain consistent through all reporting stages.
- **3.2** – Further clarification required concerning whether the competent authority referral code will be consistent with 3.1.
- **3.3** – Unclear why this is mandatory for the intermediate and final report unless recurring incidents is the basis of the incident. Clarification required that this mandatory only when the incident is being reporting as recurring.
- **3.6** – FI are not able to provide this while responding to the incident and this should not be mandatory in the Intermediate report. Suggest change to yes, if applicable for the intermediate and final report. Clients are not affected in all circumstances. It should be a range instead of a specific number.
- **3.7** – Same comment as above.
- **3.8** – Same comment as above but in relation to financial counterparts instead of clients.

- **3.9-3.13** – Same comments as above.

- **3.10** - We require its deletion. These declarations might potentially affect Financial Entities self-defense rights against 3rd parties, clients, investors, regulators, competent authorities.

- **3.14** – We welcome the RTS’s flexibility concerning the use of estimates as often this information is unavailable and irrelevant when responding to the incident. We would welcome clarification concerning the outcomes of any incident if 3.14 determines that the majority of information is based on estimates.

- **3.15** – The criteria for reputational impact is overly detailed and an incident respond manager would be unable to undertake a sufficient analysis, while responding to an incident, to appropriately respond to this data field. Suggest a substantive reduction in detail. Suggest to include it in the final report.

- **3.16** – Same suggestion as above.

- **3.20** and **3.21** – We suggest deletion. These declarations might potentially affect FEs self-defense rights against third parties, clients, investors, regulators, competent authorities. Also, Fes would be unable to determine how an incident has affected a third party within another Member State.

- **3.26** – All classification criteria for incidents are not defined within the RTS and cause interpretation issues. Further information or examples should be provided to aid interpretation. All subsequent data fields relate to the classification criteria in 3.26 (e.g. 3.27, 3.28, 3.40, 3.41) and therefore cause further interpretation issues within other data fields. Notably, the cybersecurity classification choice introduces substantially more fields to be inputted. This is notable in relation to cybersecurity and if those relate to the 8 threats and techniques included within 3.27.

- **3.28** – Due to a reliance on 3.26, ‘other’ could be chosen in the field due to interpretation issues which would lead to burdensome reporting requirements within this field. This is overly detailed for an incident report.

- **3.29** - Suggest moving it to the final report.

- **3.31** - We suggest its deletion. It could be a massive amount of elements.

- **3.32** – It is an FI responsibility to determine whether an incident should be communicated with a client or financial counterpart. Numerous incidents could relate to a client or third party but still have no impact on the service being provided to that client or third party. Information can be confidential and this should not be mandated within an incident reporting
notification. Further clarification should provided to ensure this is not enforced on financial entities.

- **3.33** – This is an overly onerous requirement and has limited objective related to responding to an incident. It is unclear what the authority will use from this information outlining the communication to client or counterpart. Communications with clients and counterparts can vary according to a relationship manager or the commercial relationship. This communication is not always required and can be outside of an incident response process. Communication can be confidential and sharing that information is unreasonable in all circumstances. Flexibility or proportionality should be provided.

- **3.34-3.35** – Clarification should be provided that reporting to other authorities outside of the EU is not enforced within the incident reporting template. Communication with authorities can be confidential.

- **3.36-3.37** – This is overly detailed for a financial entity and could include a significant array of information should this be mandatory. Information should be yes if applicable and dependent on the impact of the incident.

- **3.38** – The actions of a CSIRT is not a documented process within an incident management process. A financial entity should not be accountable for providing the actions of CSIRTs within an incident report and it is unclear concerning the objective of this data field. Suggest removal.

- **3.40** – High level of detail is overburdensome.

- **3.41** – The sharing of vulnerability information within incident reports causes significant cybersecurity risk and the financial entity reserve the right to not provide detailed vulnerability information. Information is confidential and will reflect a cybersecurity risk for the entity receiving reports.

Data fields proposed in the draft RTS and the Annex to the ITS for inclusion in the final report for major incidents under DORA

**Proliferation of mandatory data fields within the final report:** The RTS, through the initial and intermediate reports, uses a significant array of “yes if applicable” field requirements that reduce the reporting burden on entities responding to incidents. This also reduces the level of superfluous information that the regulator will receive. Nonetheless, at the final report stage, a significant proportion of these become mandatory despite many still remaining non-applicable and little to do with the incident in question. We recommend these are further rationalised as the majority would become estimates and, following the resolution of the incident, likely backfilled in all circumstances by the financial entity with little relevance to the impact of the incident on the Member State. Examples:
a. Incident affecting other financial counterparts or third parties or clients.
b. Information on whether the major incident is recurring.

- **4.8** – The incident root cause and the resolving of the incident are two individual items. Suggest splitting out into two fields.

- **4.10** – It unclear regarding what incident would reach the level required to report resolution authorities via an incident reporting mechanism. Incidents that cause capital and/or liquidity-based impacts for critical financial entities will constitute severe incidents with substantial economic effects. Regulatory supervisors will likely be engaged and a DORA-based incident report would be an inappropriate mechanism to inform regulators. Suggest removal.

- **4.13** – Suggest ‘yes if applicable’.

- **4.18** - We suggest its deletion. These declarations might potentially affect FEs self-defense rights against 3rd parties, clients, investors, regulators, competent authorities…

- **4.20** - CRR3 regulation, in particular: The concept of "losses due to forgone revenues" is not included.

- **4.22** - CRR3 regulation, in particular: Advisory: Only include the services required to manage the incident. Any other potential consultancy services to define the remediation plans should not be included.

- **4.24** - We request clarification on this field.

**Data fields proposed in the RTS and the Annex to the draft ITS for inclusion in the notification for significant cyber threats under DORA**

DIGITALEUROPE agrees with the data fields proposed in the RTS and the Annex to the draft ITS for inclusion in the notification for significant cyber threats under DORA.

**Proposed reporting requirements set out in the draft ITS**

Data fields which could be deemed irrelevant/overly burdensome or concerning: Certain fields are either highly convoluted, such as the 10 fields for the cost of the incident, or do not appear to relate to the incident. Two fields describing the involvement of CSIRTs seems unusual information to receive from a financial entity and certain fields, such as a breach of contractual arrangements or information concerning the vulnerabilities exploited likely include confidential information.

We welcome the ability for financial entities to update/revise previously submitted information from earlier notifications, including any reclassification of the incident as non-major. We also suggest requesting details about what should be done in the opposite case. When an incident is not considered
relevant in the following 24hrs from its detection, but it becomes a major one in the future.

**Art. 1.3:** we suggest deleting "accurate" / "Where accurate data is not available for the initial notification or the intermediate report, the financial entity shall provide estimated values based on other available data and information to the extent possible."

**General comments, recurrent incidents and reclassification of incidents**

**General comments:**
- The fields in the cost-related reports should align with the final version of the “Guidelines on the estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents”
- Various fields are not required under PSD2. Further clarifications are required to understand the goal DORA pursuing: Impaction on Third Parties/financial entities; and BCP activation.

**Recurrent incidents:**
- Propose to establish the criteria for the materiality or severity of the incidents, focusing on recurrence exclusively for the ones classified as major incidents.

**Reclassification of incidents:**
- Further details on the transition from a non major to a major incident for reporting purposes.
- Inclusion of reclassification of incidents in earlier reporting stages to avoid overwork, extending beyond the final report.

**Subcontracting of Critical or Important Functions**

**Appropriateness and Clarity of Articles 1 and 2**

**Article 1:**

**General remarks**

Although the title of the RTS makes reference to subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions as mandated by Article 30(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, this is not explicitly included in Article 1. Therefore, we believe it should be clarified in Article 1 that it applies “when subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions as mandated by Article 30(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”.

Bearing in mind that the analysis of the complexity and risk considerations requires the initial ICT third-party service providers to provide the information, we see merit on including a mention to clarify that ICT third-party service
providers should make reasonable efforts to provide all the relevant information required in Article 1.

Reintegration and transferability of ICT services

Article 1(h) of the draft RTS requires financial entities to assess the “the difficulty of reintegrating the ICT service”, and Article 1(f) calls for financial entities to consider the “transferability” of the ICT service to another ICT third-party service provider. These two articles address the same underlying point, namely the financial entity’s capacity to replace the ICT service if the ICT third-party service provider has not provided an appropriate service or the financial entity has become aware of a better alternative (either in-house or offered by a different third-party service provider).

Currently, Articles 1(h) and 1(f) are independent, suggesting that a service should both be able to be brought in house and transferred to a new third-party service provider. Given that these two approaches serve the same purpose, we recommend clarifying that they are alternatives, meaning that (for example) where it is easy to transfer services to a new ICT third-party service provider, it is not as important to be able to “reintegrate” the services. Indeed, in many cases, reintegrating the services into a financial entity’s internal IT environment will create more risk, as in-house or on-premises IT systems may be less resilient and secured than third-party cloud services.

To address this issue, we recommend the following amendment:

Insert, at the beginning of Article 1(h) the words:

“Where the ICT service cannot feasibly be transferred to another ICT third-party service provider as described in Article 1(f) above”.

In addition, Article 1(i) refers to “concentration risks” – a term which is similar to the term “ICT concentration risks” defined in DORA. The use of similar but not exactly aligned terms creates uncertainty and increases the risk of divergence between the interpretation of DORA and of the draft RTS. To address this, we recommend being explicit that the term used in Article 1(i) of the RTS has the same meaning as in DORA, by replacing the term “concentration risks” with the term “ICT concentration risks as that term is defined in Article 3(29) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”.

Article 2:

We have doubts regarding the references to DORA, as we observe that there is a lack of reference to DORA Article 30 (3) regarding the contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or important functions. In this regard, this issue was already corrected in the final report of the draft Regulatory Technical Standards to specify the detailed content of the policy in relation to the contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or important functions provided by ICT third-party service providers as mandated by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, this reference should also be included in Article 2.
Appropriateness and Clarity of Article 3

It would be helpful if the RTS stated that financial entities should have regard to publicly available information and existing industry standards, where available, when carrying out its assessment pursuant to Article 3(1). Furthermore, Under Article 3, the assessment cannot be undertaken unless there is a direct and thorough participation of the ICT third-party service provider (ICT TPP) and the potential subcontractors. Therefore, we would see merit on including a specific reference to clarify that ICT third-party service provider and potential subcontractors should make reasonable efforts to provide the necessary information to comply with this Article, subject to confidentiality obligations and the need to protect commercial sensitive information such as, but not limited to, trade secrets, pricing, etc.

RTS should also clarify at what stage of the contracting process a financial entity would be expected to carry out the assessment required by Article 3(1). Some of the provisions of the RTS, such as Article 3(1)(c), assume that a contractual agreement between the financial entity and the ICT third-party service provider will already in place at the time the assessment is to be carried out. However, we assume that the assessment would (or at least could) be carried out by the financial entity before entering into a contractual agreement with the ICT third-party service provider. If it is accepted that the assessment is (or could be) pre-contractual, it is not feasible to impose requirements on the ICT third-party service provider concerning the assessment, as suggested by other commenters, because there would be no contract between the parties by which to enforce such a requirement. Notwithstanding this, if the RTS were amended so as to require the ICT third-party service provider to provide the financial entity with information necessary to complete its assessment, we suggest that such requirement be limited to information the ICT third-party service provider actually has/is capable of providing.

Article 3(1)(a): We suggest adding the word "appropriate" before the words "operational reporting and operational testing" and to delete the words “as required by the financial entity” at the end of the paragraph. We suggest this amendment because the degree to which an ICT subcontractor could participate in operational testing may depend on various factors including the nature of the ICT services subcontracted and the type of operational testing envisaged. For example, in the context of public cloud services, subcontracted functions might not lend themselves to certain forms of operational testing for security or other reasons.

Regarding Article 3 (1) b) “that the ICT third-party service provider will be able to inform and involve the financial entity in the decision-making related to subcontracting when relevant and appropriate”, we would appreciate having more clarity regarding the scope, extent and implications of the concept of “decision-making” and “involvement” therein.

Additionally, regarding certain obligations (e.g. Article 3 (1) c), we would like to ask for a clarification of the evidence to be presented in order to fulfil the provision, and around the fact that such obligation should be
subject to any applicable confidentiality and proprietary information obligation. For example, would an option to comply with Article 3 (1) c) be to have a certificate issued by the ICT TPP in which it ensures that all contractual obligations have been incorporated into the contract signed with the subcontractor and that the entity and authorities are allowed to receive evidence of the signed clauses that regulate such obligations?

In Article 3(1)(d) we suggest adding the words “as appropriate” at the end of the paragraph, to avoid an inappropriate one-size-fits-all approach. This is important because the degree to which, and the way in which, an ICT third-party service provider can monitor its subcontractors may vary depending on the nature of the subcontracted services.

Article 3 requires financial entities to assess a range of factors before deciding whether an ICT service supporting critical or important functions may be subcontracted by an ICT third-party service provider. Article 3(1)(d) and 3(1)(e) are inconsistent in that Article 3(1)(d) uses the term “monitor its subcontractors” whereas 3(1)(e) uses the broader term “monitor and oversee the ICT service”. It is not sufficiently clear from the text what the additional steps financial entities should take in respect of such “oversight” are, leaving those entities in an uncertain position – particularly since existing guidance such as the EBA’s Final Report on the Guidelines on Outsourcing Arrangements uses the term “oversee” to describe an ICT third-party service provider’s responsibility (paragraph 78c) rather than a financial entity’s responsibility. To remedy this, we recommend clarifying this by amending Article 3(1)(e) to insert the words “as required by Article 5(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554,” before the words “oversee the ICT service”.

Article 3(1)(f) provides that financial entities must consider “the impact of a possible failure of a subcontractor on the provision of ICT services supporting critical or important functions on the financial entity’s digital operational resilience and financial soundness, including step-in rights”. The phrase “digital operational resilience” is very broad which could cause financial entities’ focus on high-risk issues to be diluted, and “financial soundness” is undefined, meaning its interaction with DORA is unclear and financial entities may end up taking divergent approaches in the face of this uncertainty. To ensure that financial entities focus on material risks, and to increase certainty for financial entities and ICT third-party service providers in implementing Article 3(1)(f), we recommend that its wording be aligned with existing DORA thresholds regarding the seriousness of failures. Moreover, for certain types of subcontracted ICT services – for example, those related to public cloud services that serve multiple tenants – a particular financial entity having step-in rights in respect of such subcontracted services would not be appropriate because of the impact on other tenants.

Specifically, we recommend that Article 3(1)(f) be amended by: first, replace the words “the impact of a possible failure of a subcontractor on” with the words “the potential of a failure of a subcontractor to materially impair” and delete the words “on the financial entity’s digital operational resilience and financial soundness”, as well as to add the words “where appropriate” at the end of the paragraph.
Finally, Article 3(2) provides that financial entities should periodically re-assess whether ICT services may be subcontracted to an ICT third-party service provider. This re-assessment must reflect changes in the financial entity’s business environment, including changes to the business functions, ICT threats, concentration risks, and geopolitical risks. While we encourage the periodic re-assessment of risks, the terms used in Article 3(2) are currently not aligned with similar terms used in DORA, which creates additional uncertainty and complexity for financial entities when conducting their (re)assessment. As such, we recommend that the wording in Article 3(2) be aligned with existing wording used in DORA, namely “ICT risk” and “ICT concentration risk”.

Concretely, we recommend the following amendments to Article 3(2): replace the phrase “ICT treats, concentration risks and geopolitical risks” with the phrase “ICT risks that may create a material impairment to the financial entity as described in Article 3(22) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, ICT concentration risks and geopolitical risks”.

Appropriateness and Clarity of Article 4

Article 3:

Subcontractor scope: The RTS applies risk management and contracting requirements to the entire ICT subcontracting chain of an ICT TPP in respect of services supporting critical or important functions, or material parts thereof. This approach does not reflect current industry practices and risks capturing an unworkably broad scope of ICT services and subcontractors. This would add unnecessary complexity to an FE’s risk management practices, without commensurate benefit to risk management, and would divert resources from managing supply chain risks that have the potential to materially impact the delivery of the contracted service. It is impractical to expect an FE to directly assess and manage every risk across each element of the supply chain, particularly across complex and vast subcontractor ecosystems and without application of the principle of proportionality.

- Art. 3: It is inappropriate for the RTS to dictate terms that must be included in subcontracts. Especially where those terms are more onerous than the equivalent terms that must be included in the contract between the financial entity and the provider.

In order to clarify that the provisions would only affect critical or important functions we would propose the following amendment: Both, after the words “for each ICT”, as well as after the words “for that portion of the ICT”, add the words “services supporting a critical or important functions”.

The RTS implies the need to adapt contracts with critical suppliers in order to incorporate the nuances that these clauses provide to already existing Guidelines (for instance, EBA Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements (EBA/GL/2019/02) and ESMA and EIOPA Cloud Outsourcing Guidelines). Therefore, we believe there should be a transitional period to adapt the
contracts, since some specific details of these articles were not included in previous rules.

The RTS should not introduce termination rights that were actively considered and rejected in DORA level 1. Suggested amendment in paragraph j): delete the words “or in case the provision of services fails to meet levels agreed by the financial entity”.

**Article 4:**

Article 4 of the RTS specifies 10 specific mandatory clauses to be included in the contracting agreement between a financial entity and an ICT third-party service provider, all of which are additional to the contractual clauses already required by Article 30 of the Regulation. Not only is this excessive and burdensome for the contracting parties, but we do not consider that the ESAs have a mandate under Article 30(5) of the Regulation to specify additional mandatory contractual clauses in this RTS. The ESA’s mandate under Article 30(5) is to “develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify further the elements referred to in paragraph 2, point (a), which a financial entity needs to determine and assess when subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions.” The proposed requirements in Article 4 of the RTS go beyond this and as such we object to Article 4 in general and request that it be deleted.

If, notwithstanding the objection above, the ESAs decide to retain Article 4, we have the following specific comments:

**Article 4** is intended to set out conditions for the provision of ICT services supporting critical or important functions (as reflected in the title of Article 4 and in the recitals to the draft RTS). As such, it should be made clear that the requirements described in Article 4 are scoped only to ICT services supporting critical or important functions, to avoid unnecessary cost or complexity being introduced to minor ICT services that serve no critical or important function. Concretely, we propose the following amendments to the first paragraph of **Article 4**: first, insert after the words “identify which ICT services support critical or important functions” the words “describe which critical or important functions those ICT services support in sufficient detail to enable the ICT third-party service provider to identify which elements of its ICT services support critical or important functions of the financial entity”. Second, insert after the words “the written contractual agreement shall specify” the words “in respect of ICT services supporting a critical or important function”.

**Article 4(c)** requires ICT third-party service providers to assess “all risks… associated with the location of the potential subcontractor”. This is very broad and it is not clear what risks this is intended to encompass (e.g., it potentially requires an ICT third-party service provider to consider risks that are entirely unrelated to any financial entity). We therefore recommend clarifying that this article refers to risks to ICT services supporting a critical or important function. In addition, the reference to a “potential” subcontractor presupposes that an ICT third-party service provider has not yet been appointed. Financial entities already make use of ICT third-
party service providers to support critical or important functions, and Article 4(c) should reflect this. We therefore propose the following amendments to Article 4(c): first, replace the words “assess all risks” with the words “assess all risks to the ICT service supporting a critical or important function that are relevant to whether there might be a material impairment of the kind described in Article 3(22) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”. Second, replace the words “potential subcontractor” with the words “current subcontractor”.

**Article 4(f):** The contractual arrangements between a financial entity and ICT third-party service provider do not necessarily require the “continuous” provision of services. Rather, the provision of services is usually subject to conditions such as planned downtime and the occurrence of force majeure, and it is uncommon for service levels to specify 100% availability 27/4. Therefore, Article 4(f) should be amended as suggested to clarify that the extent to which an ICT third-party service provider is required to ensure the provision of the ICT services in these circumstances is limited to the agreed service levels/commitments. We suggest the following amendment: delete the word “continuous” and after the words “ICT services supporting critical or important functions” add the words “in accordance with the agreed service levels”. Moreover, Article 4(f) requires ICT third-party service providers to ensure continuous provision of their services (as reflected in the service levels and other contractual obligations applicable to the ICT third-party service provider) even in case of failure by a contractor. We recommend clarifying Article 4(f) by inserting a comma after the word “subcontractor” to ensure that it is clear that the Article requires the ICT third-party service provider to meet their service levels.

**Article 4(g):** We do not understand this requirement. It states that for each ICT service eligible for subcontracting, the written contractual agreement between the financial entity and the ICT third-party service provider must specify “the incident response and business continuity plans in accordance with Article 11 of [the Regulation] and service levels to be met by the ICT subcontractors.” Article 11 refers to the incident response and business continuity plans of the financial entity. What does it mean to “specify” those plans in the contractual agreement? And what would be expected of the ICT third-party service provider and subcontractor regarding those plans? We wish to point out that a third-party service provider is not able to validate, approve or ‘agree to’ a financial entity’s own plans to the extent they include elements that are internal to the financial entity or otherwise outside the ICT third-party service provider’s purview. Overall, it is unclear what standard Article 4(g) is attempting to set with respect to ICT subcontractors – for example, whether they should comply with the financial entity’s business continuity plan or whether they should comply with their own business continuity plan. By contrast, Article 30(3)(c) DORA, which sets out the provisions to be included in contracts with ICT third-party service providers, uses the phrase “implement and test business contingency plans and have in place ICT security measures…” – the wording is clearer and more precise than the wording of the draft RTS. To clarify this provision of the draft RTS, and to ensure consistency with the text of DORA, Article 4(g) of the draft RTS should be aligned with Article 30(3)(c) of DORA.
We recommend to amend Article 4(g) by replacing the words “incident response and business continuity plans in accordance with Article 11” with the words “business contingency plans described in Article 30(3)(c).” Article 4(h) refers to subcontractors’ compliance with “ICT security standards and any additional security features… in line with the RTS mandated by Article 28(10) of [DORA]”. The RTS mandated by Article 28(10) does not itself set out ICT security standards or features; rather, individual financial entities’ third-party risk policies will set out their requirements and it is more appropriate to refer to those policies here. We therefore recommend amending Article 4(h) as follows: first, remove the words “and any additional security features”; second, replace the words “RTS mandated by Article 28(10)” with “financial entity’s ICT third-party risk strategy developed under Article 28(2)“.

Article 4(l): obligation on audit, information and access rights should be limited to the “first level” of subcontracting (only of ICT services supporting a critical or important function). It would be more practical to clarify that ICT TPP would need to require their in-scope subcontractors to give the ICT TPP audit rights, which the ICT TPP can then exercise if required, and then the ICT TPP can require their in-scope subcontractors to do the same with their own subcontractors (to the extent it would indeed be required to continue down the supply chain).

**Appropriateness and Clarity of Article 5**

Clarify that “ICT subcontracting chain” refers to ICT subcontractors who have further subcontracted the entire / whole ICT service or a material part thereof, and only to the extent that it is (still) supporting a critical or important function.

Ensure: the definition of “ICT service supply chain” in the ITS on registers of information is consistent with the use of “ICT subcontracting chain” (undefined) in this RTS.

**Article 5 (1):** we believe it is important to establish a limit consistent with the objective of the RTS in terms of monitoring outsourcing of services that support critical or important functions. In order to avoid broad interpretations, the provision should clearly specify that the monitoring indicated in the article should be linked only to those subcontractors in the chain that provide services that support critical or important functions.

**Article 5 (2):** we consider it should be amended to provide different possibilities to carry out the review of whether the contractual obligations that the initial ICT services provider is obliged to transfer to its subcontractor chain have actually been carried out. In order to apply the principle of proportionality of Article 4, we believe the wording should be modified to allow such obligations to be accredited through evidence provided by the ICT services provider or its subcontractors. Therefore, in Article 5(2), we suggest after the words “and key performance indicators” adding the words “, as appropriate,”
Appropriateness and Clarity of Articles 6 and 7

The services provided by a third-party ICT services provider may support a range of functions – both critical and non-critical. To ensure that financial entities’ oversight is appropriately concentrated on critical or important functions, and not distracted by minor or inconsequential changes, 

**Articles 6 and 7 should be amended to clarify that obligations are targeted to subcontractors supporting critical or important functions, rather than all subcontractors.**

**Articles 6(4) and 7(1)** provide that “the financial entity shall have a right to request modifications” and “has a right to terminate the agreement” in certain situations. The purpose of DORA Article 30(5) and of this draft RTS is to describe the contract entered between the ICT services provider and the financial entity, rather than to create independent obligations on the ICT service provider, but the current language does not make this sufficiently clear.

**Concretely, we propose the following amendments:**

**Article 6:**

**First,** amend article 6(1) to insert after the words “in case of any material changes to the subcontracting arrangements” the words “in relation to ICT services supporting critical or important functions”.

**Second,** the requirement that financial entities have the right to approve or modify changes to subcontracting arrangements is incompatible with the one-to-many nature of public cloud services. Suggested amendments: In paragraph 3) delete the words “the financial entity has either approved or not objected to the changes by”.

**Third,** amend article 6(4) to replace the words “have a right to” with the words “ensure through the ICT contractual arrangement with its ICT third-party service provider that the financial entity may.”

Furthermore, we do not agree with the obligation to communicate the result of the risk assessment as such to the supplier, as we only consider it necessary to inform whether the proposed subcontracting is satisfactory. The result of the risk assessment is confidential information that should not be communicated and does not provide any help to the supplier since the risk analysis methodology is internal and specific to each entity.

It would be convenient if Article 6 indicated a minimum period of notice for the ICT service provider in order to avoid an imbalance between the parties in situations in which providers set short deadlines that effectively prevent the entity from carrying out its assessments. A minimum period of 60 days would allow entities to collect sufficient information and to take appropriate action.

We also suggest that “material changes” be defined as “changes that are reasonably expected to have a material adverse impact on the provision of the ICT services in accordance with the contractual agreement between the
financial entity and the ICT third-party service provider”. Leaving the phrase “material changes” undefined would create a risk of it being interpreted too broadly, which would undermine the principle of proportionality.

**Article 7:**

Amend article 7 to replace the words “the financial entity has a right to terminate the agreement” with the words “the financial entity shall ensure through the ICT contractual arrangement with its ICT third-party service provider that it has a right to terminate the agreement”.

Amend article 7 to insert the words “in respect of the ICT services supporting critical or important functions” after the words “agreement with the ICT third-party service provider”.

Amend article 7(a) to insert the words “for ICT services supporting critical or important functions” after the words “material changes to subcontracting arrangements”.

We believe that Article 7 should also refer to DORA Article 28 (7) and not only to Article 28 (10).

Moreover, we suggest that Article 7(1)(a) be amended because Article 6 does not require necessarily that the financial entity expressly approve material changes. It contemplates that non-objection within the specified notice period may be sufficient. Therefore, the termination right in Article 7(1)(a) relating to lack of approval should only apply in circumstances where the parties have agreed that the financial entity must expressly approve material changes and such approval was not given within the specified notice period. Therefore, in Article 7(1)(a) we suggest adding the words “any necessary” before the word “approval”.

**Article 8, risk, proportionality, monitoring and oversight and contractual arrangements**

**Article 8:**

We would like to express our concern regarding the short period of time between the implementation of the RTS and the DORA application date. The implementation deadline for the contractual requirements for subcontracting must extend beyond 17 Jan 2025.

Art. 30 (2): DORA does not provide a mandate for the RTS to specify further contractual requirements beyond those in Article 30. We strongly urge that the contractual requirements for subcontracting are removed from the RTS.

In terms of risk factors to be considered by FEs we would like to emphasize that it is the service that creates the material risk and not the location it is provided from. Therefore, we suggest removing ‘location of ICT subcontractor or its parent company, and location of data processing and storage’ as risk factors to be considered by FEs.
Proportionality: The RTS also fails to apply an explicit proportionate and risk-based approach as the ESAs continue to broadly consider that: (i) all ICT services supporting critical or important functions carry the same level of risk (or importance) to an FE; and (ii) any subcontractor linked to an ICT service supporting, or supporting material parts of, a critical or important function as equal regardless of their role and potential impact to the delivery of services. The application of a materiality threshold in accordance with a proportionate and risk-based approach will ensure that FEs are able to identify and monitor the material risks along the subcontracting chain, and those subcontractors whose disruption or failure could lead to a material impact to service provision. This approach will also reflect the intention in the DORA legislative text for a proportionate approach to ICT third-party risk management.

Monitoring and oversight: The RTS introduces requirements for FEs to monitor and oversee subcontractors directly (where possible and appropriate). This is not an appropriate regulatory measure and does not reflect real world legal and practical limitations. FEs implement comprehensive due diligence processes and contractual provisions to ensure the risks associated with the use of subcontractors are managed and mitigated. It is not practical or feasible for FEs to exercise direct oversight over subcontractors that it does not have a direct contractual relationship with, particularly without explicit reference to proportionality.

Contractual arrangements:

- Certain requirements applying to contracts undermine fundamental and accepted contractual legal principles, including: the requirement in Article 5(2) that the FE review the contractual arrangements between an ICT TPP and its subcontractor; and the more explicit requirement in Article 3(1)(c) to ensure that certain clauses of the contract between the FE and ICT TPP are replicated in the contract between the ICT TPP and its subcontractor.

- The expectation that FEs review contractual arrangements between an ICT TPP and its subcontractor gives the FE, as an entity that is not party to the contract, visibility and a say in contract formation is not appropriate. It risks undermining fundamental contractual legal principles aimed at preserving confidentiality and protecting the rights and obligations of contracting parties. It could also raise conflict of law considerations, such as antitrust concerns if, for example, supplier pricing arrangements are exposed to FE clients.

- The contractual requirements also fail to account for the fact that subcontracting arrangements are often not established at the inception of the original contract between an FE and the ICT TPP. This introduces a practical challenge for FEs and ICT TPPs in meeting the prescribed requirements when subcontracting arrangements are finalised following the execution of the original contract.
Threat-led Penetration Testing (TLPT)

Proposed cross-sectoral approach

The alignment with the TIBER framework is supported in principle.

Proposed approach on proportionality

We strongly support the principle of proportionality in the criteria that are used to identify financial entities required to perform TLPT and limiting the requirement to financial entities that are systemically important and mature from an ICT perspective. We are however concerned that the draft RTS does not apply this principle sufficiently rigorously. In particular the decision not to permit internal testers by globally significant credit institutions would fail to leverage the level of expertise which has been carefully developed in recent years within these firms. In the field of cyber risk such expertise is limited and hard-sought and should not be overlooked where there is capacity, especially due to the possible concerns on the availability of external testers. Another example would be the rigid application of timeframes, which go beyond the TIBER requirements and fail to provide discretion for the financial entity to react to unforeseen events or delays.

Furthermore, it would be helpful to better understand what specific criteria the TLTP authorities will apply when assessing the ICT maturity of a financial entity for the purposes of determining whether it should be required to perform TLPT.

A bigger concern relates to the fact that certain ICT third-party service providers will be required by their financial entity customers, per Article 30(3)(d) of the Regulation, to participate and cooperate in those financial entities’ TLPT. For those ICT third-party service providers, it is impossible to anticipate how many financial entity customers will require such participation and cooperation and therefore difficult to prepare operationally in terms of staffing and scaling. Given the number of Member States and financial entities involved, there is a significant risk of a single ICT third-party service being overrun with TLPT exercises, which would impose an unreasonable administrative and financial burden on them and result in an increase in the cost of services. Therefore, there should be a mechanism in the regulation to avoid this. For example, relevant ICT third-party service providers should be entitled to participate in the Control Team and Blue Team and to be involved in determining a TLPT’s scope and timeline so that resourcing can be better managed.
Two-layered approach proposed to identify financial entities required to perform TLPT

We do not believe that the lack of ICT maturity of a financial institution should be a criterion to exclude it from TLP tests, but rather the criterion should be the possible impact on customers or in the sector.

Proposed quantitative criteria and thresholds in Article 2(1) of the draft RTS to identify financial entities required to perform TLPT

We would appreciate having more clarity regarding TLPT in financial entities that may be part of a financial group in order to decide if the requirement to perform TLPT would be on an individual basis or not.

Furthermore, we would ask for clarification on whether the obligation to conduct TLPT at least every 3 years, should be interpreted as every 3 years from the closure of the preceding TLPT exercise, or every 3 calendar years.

Additional aspects of the TIBER-EU process in the RTS

The RTS should include aspects that go beyond TIBER-EU framework to address use cases involving cloud service providers and SaaS service providers. In a cloud context, financial entities would not have control of relevant functions in order to execute processes prescribed in TIBER-EU framework. The RTS should require financial entities to collaborate with cloud service providers because if they do not do so, the TLPT could harm the service provider’s operational resilience. Such collaboration would enable the financial entities to do proper risk management of the entire TLPT activity against a particular application.

We strongly support the incorporation of the use of internal testers within TLPT exercises. This has long been an ask, given the level of resourcing required to perform these exercises and the pools of expertise within globally significant credit institutions. It is therefore highly regrettable that the proposal has not been extended to these entities and we would urge the ESAs to reconsider.

We are in favour of close alignment with the existing TIBER process, given the level of familiarity which has been built up regarding that framework. We would strongly urge the ESAs that where they have decided to go beyond the existing practice, and include additional aspects, for example on pooled testing, this is accompanied with a set of guidelines on how firms should apply these new requirements. There is a lot of uncertainty on how these extensions would work in practice which is not addressed within the draft RTS. Please see below for our specific concerns on pooled testing.

There is similar concern over the broader proposal to include third party providers within TLPT testing, in addition to pooled testing. There is a
high degree of skepticism at the value of including third party infrastructure within testing by the Financial Entities, as it will only lead to a less open and transparent environment due to the inevitable need for additional safeguards around access to systems and databases.

We welcome the proposal for any additional requirements to be carried back across in due course to the TIBER framework, so that in future the two frameworks are aligned and consistent.

**Approach for financial entities to assess the risks stemming from the conduct of testing by means of TLPT**

Article 5(1) of the RTS refers to the risk assessment to be conducted by the Control Team as part of the preparation phase. Our concern is that in the context where the TLPT concerns SaaS services, the Control Team will not be able to assess appropriately the risks of carrying out TLPT in respect of software that is delivered as SaaS service by an ICT third-party service provider (due to the impact on other tenants in a multi-tenant environment) unless the service provider is involved in the Control Team risk assessment. Therefore, we strongly suggest that SaaS service providers be entitled to be part of the Control Team (and Blue Team) or, at the very least, that Article 5(1) be amended as follows: after the words “the control team shall” add the words “, with the involvement of relevant ICT third-party services providers as appropriate”.

Also, requiring TLPT to be performed in a live production environment may result in issues or detections in production. We suggest that allowance be made for TLPT to be performed in a copy of a production environment to avoid this risk.

Overall, further clarity should be introduced in terms of how the requirement on indemnity insurances applies to a pooled exercise with multiple entities.

Article 8 of the draft RTS sets out the process for the red team testing phase of the TLPT. To expedite the red team’s testing, Article 8(8) enables the control team (whose members may include ICT third-party service providers) to provide “leg-ups” to the red team, in accordance with the red-team test plan.

TLPT is an important cyber defence measure for financial entities, and “leg-ups” can help to expedite the testing process and discover vulnerabilities in a financial entity’s systems that would otherwise not be discovered. However, carrying out TLPT creates inherent risks, including confidentiality and availability risks (as the draft RTS acknowledges – see paragraph 34). These risks can be particularly acute for cloud service providers who provide services to multiple financial entities. Specifically, risks introduced by one customer carrying out TPLT could, in certain circumstances, affect many other customers, including other financial entities and, further, other non-financial institutions (including public sector
organizations such as the European Supervisory Authorities and other regulatory bodies).

We recommend that recital 18 be amended as follows:

1: Before the words “ICT system or internal network” insert the words “the financial entity’s own”, and

2: At the end of recital 18, add the words “A “leg up” shall be limited to the financial entity’s own ICT systems or internal networks and shall not include access to a third-party ICT provider’s ICT system or internal network beyond such access as the financial entity itself ordinarily has access to and undertakes for the purpose of operating the relevant critical or important function. In particular, a “leg up” shall not enable the testers to access any third-party ICT provider’s ICT systems or internal networks used to support customers other than the financial entity, or that otherwise increases the risk of an adverse impact on the quality or security of the services provided to those customers”.

Appropriateness of proposed additional requirements for external testers and threat intelligence providers

The RTS, in addition, proposes TLPT involving relevant third parties, however, the complexity added to a TLPT with any additional third party or financial entity materially increases the complexity of a TLPT, notably in relation to process, liability, responsibility, contracts and timelines. The RTS infers that a TLPT with a third party would be a simple process, akin to a normal TLPT, but all stages of the test will require extension and further clarification concerning responsibilities. The timelines for the TLPT will not be achieved once another entity is included within a TLPT. We recommend that any test with a third party would only be undertaken in-accordance with future guidance by TIBER.

The overall model of 5 teams, with specific but sometimes not relevant qualification criteria makes the proposed model very complex and could have the unintended consequence of ruling out participants that are highly qualified.

It is currently proposed under Article 5(2)(h) that external testers would be involved in restoration procedures. We would suggest this term is replaced with the term clean-up procedures, limited to the exercise itself, as a firm’s full restoration of any impacted systems would be out-of-scope for external individuals.
Number of years of experience for threat intelligence providers and external testers required to ensure suitability, reputability and appropriate knowledge and skills

We suggest that Article 5(2)(e)(i) be amended as follows to include a requirement for threat intelligence providers to have relevant industry-accepted certifications: after the words “at least five years of experience in threat intelligence” add the words “and relevant industry-accepted certification”.

While noting the alignment with TIBER’s Services Procurement Guidelines, the proposal for the staff of both threat intelligence providers and external testers to have at least 5 years’ experience feels an overly arbitrary metric, which may impact on the availability of testers, especially in a market with fiercely sought-after expertise. We would therefore ask for greater flexibility in procuring such testers, including the ability to delay TLPT exercises if suitable personnel cannot be reasonably identified or in the event that a concentration risk arises.

Alternatively, there is considerable interest in the idea of accreditation for testers, especially in light of the information and data which these individuals will inevitably have access to, including potentially high levels of sensitivity. The accreditation could take the form of the accreditation of technical skills plus a Code of Conduct or Ethics for such personnel.

There is a difference between:

1) Technical skills of the staff to perform the tests that states which can be accredited not only with years of experience, also with specific training or certifications.

2) The Code of Conduct or Ethics to ensure that they will act accordingly and will not disclose information or there subject to appropriate internal protocols. Both of them must be required to the external tester and threat intelligence providers.

Appropriateness of the proposed testing process

The proposed process would not work well for financial entities that use SaaS service providers because in those cases financial entities would not fully be able to fulfil the Blue Team and Control Team requirements. In a SaaS context, it is the SaaS service provider (not the customer) that conducts monitoring and is responsible for the security of the services. Additionally, financial entities would not fully be able to implement remediation plans concerning the SaaS service on their own because they do not have control over the service. Therefore, we consider strongly that the TLPT process needs to involve SaaS service providers in particular on the Control Team and Blue Team. If the cloud service provider is not part of the Control Team then the scoping will be unknown to
them and, in our experience, that often leads to erroneous and misguided testing.

The scope of a TLPT should be clearly documented and comply with regulatory specification.

DIGITAL EUROPE is concerned that third party service providers in particular will be asked to undergo a large number of different penetration tests by different financial entity customers as a result of DORA. To lessen the operational impact and resource consumption that disparate penetration test requests will require on third party service providers in particular, we recommend permitting service providers to reuse evidence of testing by approved and industry-accepted independent assessors and provide such evidence to requesting parties. Allowing such reuse can provide several benefits and key advantages such as:

1. **Cost Efficiency**: Compliance efforts can be expensive, especially when they involve frequent assessments. By reusing penetration test results, organizations can reduce the cost of demonstrating compliance over multiple reporting periods.

2. **Time Savings**: Preparing for and undergoing compliance audits can be time-consuming. If recent penetration test results can be reused, it can save time during the audit process by providing ready evidence of due diligence in identifying and managing security risks.

3. **Consistent Reporting**: Reusing penetration test results can help maintain consistency in reporting as the same methodology and scope are applied. This can make it easier for auditors to verify compliance and for organizations to track progress over time.

We are concerned over the level of flexibility in the event of unforeseen circumstances, for example the lack of availability of external testers. The ability to deviate from these timeframes may be necessary to ensure that the exercise can proceed with all quality assurances fully leveraged. It may also be to the benefit of authorities, in that added flexibility or discretion would provide more opportunity for their involvement across the process. Alternatively, authorities should also be subject to specific timelines in terms of scope approvals.

**Flexibility should likewise be adopted with regards to purple teaming**, which is an important means by which financial entities can extract value from a test where the secrecy has been compromised, but where nevertheless failing to obtain lessons from the level of resourcing at stake would be incredibly wasteful. We recommend this be the focus for any mandated purple teaming going forward, with additional activities left to the discretion of the entity. Especially in light of the tight timeframes.

Further to this point on how the authorities will be engaged, as part of the proposed testing methodology, **we would seek clarification on how the remediation plans will be monitored and pursued by authorities in the follow-up to any TLPT exercise**. These TLPT exercises should be fully maximised as a learning opportunity, with all stakeholders drawing out
actionable conclusions which can be fully embedded in operations going forward. To this end, there must be time for financial entities to implement such actions, potentially with assistance/assurances from authorities. If the attention were to immediately switch to the next TLPT exercise, it would not only impede such implementation but signify that TLPT had become a tick-box mentality.

In addition, the proposed timeframes appear to be uniformly applied to all forms of TLPT, for example also to testing with third party providers and pooled testing, despite the additional challenges from a resourcing and coordination perspective. We believe such exercises require an adjusted approach and we call for the ESAs to develop specific guidelines to this effect.

**Appropriateness of the proposed requirements for pooled testing**

The RTS includes references within Article 11, 14(2) and 15(5) concerning ‘pooled testing’ however these substantially simplify the complexity relating to administering a pooled test. All timelines and requirements across the preparation, testing and closure phase of a TLPT will be materially complicated by a pooled test and the timelines proposed by the RTS will not be achieved in that circumstance. As a pooled test is a technical TLPT that does not have existing TIBER guidance, or equivalent international guidance, we do not believe that it is appropriate for pooled testing to be explicitly regulated within the RTS. We recommend that any pooled test be undertaken only in accordance with future guidance by TIBER.

The primary ask is that before any application of pooled testing, the ESAs or other competent authorities produce guidelines to clarify how these exercises would work in practice and how to tackle the additional risks associated with data and information flowing across multiple entities. In particular we flag uncertainty over the following:

- Who is responsible for owning the exercise and assuming ultimate responsibility for the control team? We acknowledge the Level 1 text states the third-party provider will directly procure an external tester, but are unclear whether this shifts the burden of responsibility completely onto the provider?
- Assuming the third-party provider will be responsible for identifying the financial entities to participate within such an exercise, will the financial entities have the right of veto if they have recently performed a TLPT exercise on the underlying systems?
- Whether the remediation plan would be developed collectively with one output having input from all parties or whether a series of separate plans by each of the entities is anticipated?
- How entities could provide shared access to data and systems, where to do so would be in breach of existing contractual restrictions and NDAs?
As discussed above, how would indemnity insurances work in this pooled context?

We would also like to understand the purported rationale for pooled testing, specifically that it should only be expected if non-pooled testing would have an adverse impact on the confidentiality of the data related to such services. Clarification on whose data would be impacted, whether the financial entity’s or the third-party providers, is sought.

We also understand that joint testing refers to the “pooled test” that is executed on the infrastructure of a provider that serves more than one bank, and each of the entities must respond with its remediation plan.

On another note, in the page 13 of the draft RTS document there is a reference to Article 14 and Article 15 (“Specific requirements relating to pooled testing have been introduced regarding the remediation plan (Article 11), the cooperation of TLPT authorities (Article 14(2)) and the attestation (Article 15(5))”. Nonetheless, the last Article of the draft RTS is Article 13. We understand these requirements are the ones mentioned in Article 12, but we would like to make sure our assumption is correct.

DORA Article 26(4) allows for “pooled testing” of third-party ICT service providers where testing is “reasonably expected to have an adverse impact on the quality or security of services delivered by the ICT third-party service provider… or on the confidentiality of the data”. We welcome the inclusion of the pooled testing regime in DORA, which can avoid unnecessary duplication of the costs and risks associated with TLPT. However, in our view, the current draft RTS does not provide sufficient encouragement or guidance to financial entities on when to use pooled testing. As a result, ICT third-party service providers who provide services to many financial entities will face duplicative costs associated with each entity separately testing the same ICT service provider. Smaller financial entities may also lack sufficient resources or expertise to adequately test ICT third-party service provider without the contribution of other financial entities in a pooled test. [This duplication of costs, and inability to pool expertise and resources, will particularly disadvantage smaller ICT third-party service providers and financial entities].

To address this, the draft RTS should be explicit in encouraging financial entities to conduct that testing through the pooled testing mechanism. We recommend inserting a new Article 6(4a) saying:

“To the extent the scope specification document envisages the testing of the services of an ICT third-party service provider, the financial entity and TLPT authority shall consider whether that testing should be conducted through a pooled test in accordance with Article 26(4) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”.

In addition, Article 8(10) allows the TLPT to be suspended where continuing the test risks “impact on data, damage to assets, and disruption to… the financial entity itself, its counterparts or to the financial sectors”. As TLPT may affect third-party ICT providers too – and as described in our response to
Question 6, damage to these providers can have more wide-ranging consequences than damage to individual financial entities – this Article should be amended to include third-party ICT providers.

To address this, we recommend that the ESAs insert a new Article 8(10a):

“Under circumstances triggering risks of impact on quality or security of services delivered by an ICT third-party service provider, the control team lead must suspend the TLPT insofar as it triggers those risks and consider continuing the TLPT using a pooled testing exercise as described in Article 26(4) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”.

Proposed requirements on the use of internal testers

The decision to exempt significant credit institutions from using internal testers is surely a missed opportunity. As stated above, it frames TLPT not as a learning exercise but an enforcement tool. We call on this restriction to be revisited at the earliest opportunity, especially in light of the proposal within this consultation, for the TLPT innovations under DORA to be carried across into the TIBER framework. Any concerns over internal testers can be mitigated, for example by requiring periodic use of external testers, as indeed is currently proposed with other types of financial entities. Future flexibility over internal testers could also alleviate any bottlenecks which arise with regards to the availability of external testers.

Appropriateness of proposed requirements on supervisory cooperation

Despite being highly supportive of the ESA’s intentions to bolster supervisory cooperation in this field, we are concerned with the current drafting on how a home TLPT authority should reach out and notify TLPT authorities in other member states of an upcoming exercise. As currently worded, there is a risk that the home authority is seen to be seeking input, and that this could lead to last-minute changes to the proposed exercise to accommodate the views of the host authorities. This could significantly alter or add to the existing TLPT expectations, and potentially cause delays. We propose the ESAs tighten the wording by clarifying that the host authority should not be seeking to revise the proposed exercise’s remit or specifications, but only be engaged as an observer.

We also seek confirmation that in the case of significant credit institutions, authorities at the member state level will be engaged as observers, to avoid the situation of dual or duplicative TLPT exercises (namely an ECB-led DORA exercise and a national level exercise under the existing TIBER framework).

Additionally, we have two points explicitly on mutual recognition:

For the purposes of mutual recognition, the attestation referred to in Article 26(6) should indicate not only the critical and important functions which were in
scope of the exercise, but information on the underlying systems, technologies and infrastructure which were tested as part of the exercise. These attributes are highly relevant for identifying commonalities between proposed TLPT tests and ensuring that duplication is avoided in terms of outcomes. Annex VII could include a data field as reference to such information.

The draft RTS fails to make reference to the possibility of third country mutual recognition. Given the growing interest in TLPT across international bodies and authorities, we would strongly encourage a specific reference to the possibility of financial entities relying upon the attestations under Article 26(6) within third countries, especially given the potential for global organisations to rely on the same set of systems for services outside the EU. In parallel, EU authorities should explore entering into mutual recognition arrangements with third country authorities, and in the interim to take account of third country exercises when determining when and how financial entities must perform TLPT under DORA.

Comments on involvement of service providers in TLPT, notification of vulnerabilities to service providers and on confidentiality

The RTS in general assumes that the financial entity is wholly responsible for managing their systems and it does not appropriately address the issue of multi-tenant cloud applications/SaaS where the cloud provider manages the environment. When a financial entity builds a system on a provider’s cloud infrastructure, the financial entity can only test what it has built and not the cloud provider’s systems. According to the shared responsibility model for cloud, the cloud provider is responsible for penetration testing of the supporting platform and cloud services. Therefore, we do not consider the TLPT methodology as described in the draft RTS to be suitable in a cloud context. The RTS as a whole is not written with cloud service providers in mind and is more for single tenant, on-premises software deployments.

Recital 9 of the RTS suggests that financial entities should mitigate the inherent elements of risk associated with performing TLPT in live production environments so that the TLPT can be conducted in a controlled manner. In our view, there is no way to fully mitigate risks to data integrity and availability when testing live production systems. Therefore, we strongly recommend that financial entities be entitled to perform TLPT only on test instances of critical systems.

Paragraph 40 of Section 3 (Background and Rationale) of the RTS states that the active red teaming part of the test has to be a minimum of 12 weeks. We consider this to be excessive and incompatible with multi-tenant cloud models. We recommend that this period be reduced to 4 weeks.
The draft RTS provides little information on the involvement of ICT third party service providers in the TLPT process, beyond acknowledging in Article 1(1) that the "control team" may include service providers. As the TIBER-EU framework white team guidance describes (in section 4.1), ICT third-party service provider personnel often have detailed knowledge about that provider’s systems and about how the financial entity uses those systems, and therefore can make valuable contributions to the testing process. For this reason, the TIBER-EU framework white team guidance encourages the control team to engage in discussion with third party ICT service providers “at an early stage” to discuss the TLPT, and considers that “a small number of staff from the third-party provider(s) can join the White Team”. We agree with the TIBER-EU white team guidance that third-party ICT service providers should be informed of and have the opportunity to input into TLPT exercises.

To ensure that the draft RTS is aligned with the TIBER-EU guidance in this respect, we recommend clarifying that, where an ICT third party service provider is impacted by the TLPT process, that ICT third party service provider should always be informed about the TLPT and, where relevant, be given the option to participate in the testing. This will improve the quality of TLPT and ensure the draft RTS is aligned with the TIBER-EU framework.

To address this, we recommend that the ESAs insert the following text at the end of Article 6(4): “To the extent the scope specification document envisages that an ICT third-party service provider will be within the scope of, or otherwise affected by, the TLPT, that third party ICT service provider shall be made aware of and, as appropriate, given the opportunity to participate in, the control team”.

- Notification of vulnerabilities to service providers

Article 9(3) of the draft RTS requires test reports to be given to the control team and test managers, and Article 8(10) sets out obligations of the red team in relation to vulnerabilities they discover during their testing that may trigger risks of “impact on data, damage to assets, and disruption to critical or important functions”. However, neither Article sets out an obligation to notify ICT third-party service providers of these test reports or vulnerabilities, to the extent those reports or vulnerabilities relate to the ICT third-party service provider, nor expressly addresses situations where a vulnerability in an ICT third-party service provider may affect multiple financial entities.

Notifying an ICT third-party service provider of vulnerabilities in its service of which it would otherwise not be aware (as the ICT third-party service provider may not be participating in or aware of the TLPT) reflects best-practice vulnerability disclosure practices and enables the ICT third-party service provider to identify and address vulnerabilities that may affect multiple customers. In turn, this improves security for all customers of the ICT third-party service provider, including other financial entities. This is the case even where the financial entity in question is able to work around or mitigate the security risks presented by the vulnerability, as other financial entities may not be aware or have taken the same mitigation measures.
To address this issue, and encourage best-practice vulnerability sharing during the TLPT process, we recommend the following amendments to the draft RTS.

*Insert, at the end of Article 9(3), the words “and, to the extent the report contains information relating to any vulnerability in the service of an ICT third-party service provider, the control team shall also provide the relevant sections of the red team test report to the ICT third-party service provider as are necessary for that provider to assess and remEDIATE the vulnerability. Insert new Article 8(12): “At any time during the active red team testing phase, upon discovery of a vulnerability in the service of an ICT third-party service provider that could adversely affect the delivery or security of services that provider provides to the financial entity or other customers, the testers will immediately inform the ICT third-party service provider of that vulnerability, and provide all relevant information they have learned about the vulnerability to the ICT third-party service provider. The testers shall provide such information to the ICT third-party service provider in a commonly used machine-readable format and, where possible, through the ICT third-party service provider’s vulnerability management system.”*

- **Confidentiality**

Sharing information relating to the security of ICT systems throughout the TLPT process is consistent with best-practice testing practice and Article 26(3) of DORA, which calls for participation in the TLPT process by ICT third-party service providers where necessary.

However, information relating to the security of ICT systems is, by its nature, highly sensitive. Article 4 of the draft RTS requires that information about the TLPT process be treated confidentially and on a “need-to-know” basis within a financial entity. However, the RTS does not oblige entities involved in the TLPT process to ensure the confidentiality of such information when it is shared between different entities involved in the TLPT process. To encourage the sharing of relevant information between those entities, including ICT third-party service providers, the Regulation should include an explicit requirement to treat that information securely and confidentially. An explicit requirement will be more effective in building trust between the parties than a patchwork of contractual and regulatory requirements.

*We propose to insert new article 4(2)(g) as follows: “Financial entities shall establish technical and organisational measures ensuring that any information shared between parties in connection with the TLPT is protected from unauthorised access, and is used and disclosed only for the purposes described in this Regulation.”*
Harmonisation of conditions enabling the conduct of the oversight activities

Content of information to be provided by ICT third party providers in the application for a voluntary request to be designated as critical

Article 1 sets out the various pieces of information that a ICT third-party service provider must submit in its application for voluntary designation as “critical”, and this list includes:

- “information on future strategy and investment plans in relation to the provision of ICT services and infrastructure to financial entities in the Union, including any planned changes in the group or management structure, entry into new markets or activities” (Art. 1(1)(j)); and
- “information on subcontractors which have been designated as critical ICT third-party service providers pursuant to Article 31(1) of [DORA]”;

Requiring ICT third-party service providers to provide general information about their strategy and investment plans is unlikely to provide the ESAs with the information they require to make the assessment of whether that service provider is “critical”. Instead, providers should only provide information on strategy and investment plans to the extent it is relevant to the assessment of whether they are “critical”. Furthermore, it is not clear what relevance the criticality of a service provider’s subcontractors have on whether the services that provider offers are themselves “critical”.

We therefore recommend that Article 1(1)(k) of the RTS is deleted, and that at the end of Article 1(1)(j), the following text is inserted: “; insofar as these plans are relevant to the factors set out in Article 31(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554”;

Clarity of process to assess the completeness of opt-in application

We believe that the process to assess the completeness of opt-in application is clear and understandable.

Clarity and completeness of list of information to be provided by critical ICT third-party service providers to the Lead Overseer to carry out its duties

It is clear from Art. 3(1) of the RTS that the power of the Lead Overseer (LO) to request information from the CTPP is limited to information that is necessary for the LO to carry out its duties. However, given the broad language used in Art. 3(2) to describe the various categories of information that may be requested, the RTS should state that a CTPP is entitled, in all
cases, to submit redacted versions, extracts or summaries of any information requested pursuant to Art. 3 as needed to avoid the inappropriate disclosure of irrelevant or unnecessary information to the LO. Also, a **CTPP should not be required to share information with the LO if such disclosure might put the CTPP in breach of its legal or regulatory obligations (for example, confidentiality obligations or obligations under the listing rules of its securities exchange).**

In the interest of proportionality, the authority of the LO under Art. 3 to request information about the CTPP’s subcontracting arrangements should be limited to arrangements concerning services that support critical or important functions.

Art. 3(2)(g) requires a CTPP to submit upon request information about how it protects sensitive data. However, “**sensitive data**” is **not defined and it is unclear what this refers to.** If it means data that is “sensitive” from the perspective of financial entities, please note that some service providers, such as cloud service providers, do not necessarily have insight into the nature of the customer data on their systems and therefore may not be able to identify sensitive data or distinguish it from other data.

Art. 3(2)(i) requires a CTPP to submit upon request information about the exact location of its data centres and ICT product centres. **Disclosing that information (even if only to the LO) would create a significant physical security risk to those facilities and therefore we request that this requirement be removed in its entirety or amended so that only the general location (e.g. city) of the relevant facilities is required to be disclosed.**

Article 3 of the RTS sets out the list of information that a critical ICT third-party service provider must submit to its Lead Overseer. This includes highly sensitive and confidential information, including about “ICT security and data protection frameworks . . . including relevant strategies, objectives, policies, procedures, protocols” (Article 3(2)(g)), information about risk management and incident response (Article 3(2)(l)) and information extracted from production systems and monitoring / scanning systems of the service provider (Articles 3(2)(p) and (q)).

If this information were to be transmitted or stored insecurely, that could have significant effects not only on the critical ICT third-party service provider and the security of their systems, but also on the financial system as a whole.

With that in mind, to ensure that critical ICT service providers share this in an appropriately secure way, **we recommend that the RTS obliges critical ICT third-party service providers to submit this information to the ESAs through secure means, ideally through systems that the ESAs already have in place to receive sensitive and confidential information.** We therefore recommend adding a new Article 3(3) to the RTS as follows: “**The critical ICT third-party service provider shall submit all information requested by the Lead Overseer using secure means to the Lead Overseer.**”
Content of Article 4 on remediation plan and progress reports

DIGITALEUROPE agrees with the content of Article 4 on remediation plan and progress reports.

Appropriateness and structure of Article 5 on the structure and format of information provided by the critical ICT third-party service provider

DIGITALEUROPE deems Article 5 on the structure and format of information provided by the critical ICT third-party service provider appropriate and structured.

Information to be provided by the critical ICT third-party service provider to the Lead Overseer

The information to be provided by the critical ICT third-party service provider to the Lead Overseer is complete, appropriate, and structured.

Article 7 on competent authorities’ assessment of the risks addressed in the recommendations of the Lead Overseer

Article 7 on competent authorities’ assessment of the risks addressed in the recommendations of the Lead Overseer is sufficiently clear.

Impact assessment

DIGITALEUROPE agrees with the impact assessment and the main conclusions stemming from it.
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About DIGITALEUROPE

DIGITALEUROPE is the leading trade association representing digitally transforming industries in Europe. We stand for a regulatory environment that enables European businesses and citizens to prosper from digital technologies. We wish Europe to grow, attract, and sustain the world’s best digital talents and technology companies. Together with our members, we shape the industry policy positions on all relevant legislative matters and contribute to the development and implementation of relevant EU policies. Our membership represents over 45,000 businesses that operate and invest in Europe. It includes 108 corporations that are global leaders in their field of activity, as well as 41 national trade associations from across Europe.